‚ÄúEvery morning I get up and thank God that he never made me an expert on the Middle East,‚ÄĚ a famous journalist once remarked to me. That was pretty much my view, too. As a journalist and later as a politician, I generally steered a wide circle around matters Middle Eastern for the very good reason that reform seemed a lost cause. The overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Arab spring have changed that.¬† A narrow window has opened in countries with little or no living memory of democracy and which in most cases do not have properly functioning parliaments.¬† For this reason I recently found myself on the Jordanian side of the Dead Sea at a conference organised by Global Partners for MPs from Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. Object of exercise: to share insights and experiences of parliament with particular reference to the standards expected of elected representatives and the level of service they should be expected to offer their constituents. The participants were for the most part sophisticated, capable politicians, whose skills would see them easily adapt to life in a well-established parliament such as Westminster, Ottawa or Paris, but alas a wide gulf separates those worlds. Iraqi MPs, with the notable exception of those from Kurdistan, are mainly confined to the so-called Green Zone, the heavily fortified administrative bloc in the centre of Baghdad.¬† He or she can only venture out with armed bodyguards and even then the risks are high.¬† Only recently an Iraqi MP attending a function outside the Green Zone was embraced by a stranger who sung God‚Äôs praises ‚Äď and then blew them both to smithereens.¬† One cannot but admire people who put themselves up for election in these circumstances. Egypt remains in turmoil.¬† Parliamentary elections are due in the coming months, but already there is talk of an opposition boycott.¬†¬† Citizens have unrealistic expectations of what they can expect from their MPs ‚Äď decades of pent up demands have suddenly been unleashed and one task of any elected representative will be to dampen expectations. And Jordan is trying to establish parliamentary democracy in a very tough neighbourhood.¬† Syria, Iraq and Israel are its immediate neighbours. None of these countries have a long-term history of multi-party democracy or governments that can be held to account.¬† The concept of a loyal opposition is unknown. All of which suggests that the learning curve will be steep, progress will be slow and there are likely to be disappointments along the way.¬† Hopefully, however, a few seeds were sown which, in due course, may turn into green shoots. Chris Mullin is a former minister. He was a British member of parliament from 1987 to 2010¬†¬†¬†
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Ola Thiabat, who ran for election to Jordan‚Äôs parliament in January, told the Jordan Times that her husband‚Äôs family forced him to end their marriage because of her campaign. ‚ÄúWhen I first decided to run for the parliament, he supported me and paid all my expenses, until his family asked him to persuade me to withdraw from the elections for the benefit of one of their relatives; when I refused to comply, he divorced me‚ÄĚ said Thiabat. Thiabat is one of 215 women out of 1425 candidates who ran for election in Jordan. Many Jordanian politicians are building their hopes on the new parliament that emerged from these elections. In a departure from tradition, the plan is to form a parliamentary government, with the new prime minister announced after consultation with the majority coalition of parliamentary blocs. If no clear majority coalition emerges in the new parliament, the designation will be based upon consultation with all parliamentary blocs. A few days before the elections, King Abdullah presented to the Jordanians his vision of the Kingdom‚Äôs reform process. In his ‚Äėroad map to democratic transformation‚Äô, King Abdullah stated three conditions that must be developed to ensure a full parliamentary government‚Äôs continued expertise and effectiveness. He noted, ‚ÄúFirst we will need to see the emergence of true national parties that aggregate specific and local interests into a national platform for action. Second, our civil service will need further to develop its professional, impartial non-political abilities to support and advice the ministers of parliamentary government. The third condition is a change in parliamentary conventions, the way parliament works, to support parliamentary government.‚ÄĚ Despite the King‚Äôs promises, some of the opposition parties went ahead with their boycott of the elections. The Islamic Action Front (IAF), the Muslim Brotherhood‚Äôs political arm, has organised rallies in the capital and other cities calling on people not to participate in the ‚Äúcosmetic‚ÄĚ elections. The IAF, Jordan‚Äôs largest opposition group, objects to the new election law approved by the parliament last year. The law is based on the so-called ‚Äėone man, two votes‚Äô electoral system. Under the new law, one of the two votes is for a district representative and the other for national-level lists that include political parties. Critics say the one man, two votes formula was introduced by the government to ‚Äúfavour government loyalists and to limit the Islamist influence.‚ÄĚ However, despite the brotherhood‚Äôs calls to boycott the elections, the total voter turnout in January‚Äôs elections was 56.69 per cent of the registered voters. Many of the 150 MPs who reached the parliament are independent candidates dependent on their clans‚Äô support to win their seats. But Islamic Centrist Party (ICP) gained 16 seats and claimed to have the largest parliamentary bloc yet to emerge. Due to the brotherhoods boycott, ICP had become a key player in Jordan‚Äôs internal politics. Based on the King‚Äôs reform plan, if ICP manages to form a majority coalition with other parliamentary blocs, they will have the chance to name the next prime minister. Forming a parliamentary government is seen by many Jordanian politicians as an important step forward towards building a democratic system. However, there are major challenges facing the Kingdom in building its democracy. Apart from the political reforms, changing the political culture and traditions are still seen as major challenges. In the latest election, 18 women only were able to get seats in the parliament, 15 of whom won their seats based on the women quota. Ms Thiabat is not among the 18 women MPs. Perhaps, missing her husband and his clan‚Äôs support, had affected Ms Thiabat chances in making her way to the parliament.
Political Parties in Democratic Transitions, edited by Greg Power and Rebecca Shoot, and published by the Danish Institute for Parties and Democracy was launched in Copenhagen at the end of September. ¬†The event brought together journalists, politicians, academics and international assistance organisations to reflect on the challenges for political parties in Egypt. The publication looks at the experience of new parties in Turkey, Serbia, Indonesia and South Africa and their role in fostering multi-party dialogue, negotiating the withdrawal of the military from politics and convincing the public that their new democracy works. ¬†The speakers ‚Äď who included Ahsraf Khalil from Time magazine and Noha El-Mikhawy from the Ford Foundation, as well as Greg Power - highlighted the current complexities of Egyptian politics, the proliferation of new parties and the uncertainties of the constitutional process. In particular they discussed the dominance of political Islam, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood‚Äôs governing strategy, their relationship with the Salafi Al-Nour party, and the prospects for the parliamentary elections due in the next few months.¬† But they also commented on the inadequacy of the electoral and political system ‚Äď the run-off between Morsi and Shafiq resulted in a ‚Äėmissing 40%‚Äô of voters who have not yet found a secure home with any of the political parties and whose future decisions will be crucial to determining the make-up of the next Egyptian parliament. As well as working with DIPD, Global Partners has been partnering Egypt‚Äôs political parties since summer 2011 to develop the role of political parties in parliament and principles for parliamentary development.
Global Partners is currently evaluating a media project in China. This piece is based on research during a trip to Beijing in July 2012. Weibo, ‚Äėthe Twitter of China‚Äô, is a popular three year old. Already bigger than Twitter it has 320 million users with big plans to take on the global micro-blogging market. Its success is all the more impressive because it has taken root in rather hostile circumstances. The majority of social media and sharing platforms ‚Äď Facebook, Twitter and YouTube included ‚Äď are banned in China, and the Arab Spring and Chinese pro-democracy protests at the beginning of 2011 triggered a tightening of government control over the media and internet. While freedom of expression is enshrined in China‚Äôs constitution, it is not substantiated in any law. Internet companies, who operate there under a system of self-discipline, struggle to identify where the legal and policy boundaries lie to avoid government penalty ‚Äď a challenge faced by traditional Chinese media for decades. Attempts by Sina, Weibo‚Äôs parent company, to placate the government come at the expense of limiting anonymous expression in China. Sina has recently introduced an ‚Äėinnovative‚Äô points deduction scheme which penalises users for violating content policy. One way that users can redeem lost points is through real-name registration, which forces users to reveal their true identities and has been compulsory in China since March this year. The company claims that their users‚Äô rights are a priority, though, and that rather than taking down or censoring content, they are increasingly accepting liability in defamation and copyright cases on behalf of users. While this might happen in only a minority of cases, it signifies that Chinese internet companies like Sina are finding ways to play by the State‚Äôs rules and protect their users‚Äô rights, at the same time. To have survived three years is a remarkable achievement for a social media platform in China. But citizens are starting to use Weibo to inform and to criticise, playing out the Chinese government‚Äôs worst fear. Take the recent Beijing floods that killed 77 plus people. It was Weibo that made public the deaths and subsequent government cover-up of the number of deaths. Citizens used the platform to voice their concerns about Beijing‚Äôs infrastructure and the poor emergency response to the disaster. So I asked why the State isn‚Äôt clamping down on Weibo, like those before it. The answer was: ‚ÄúIt‚Äôs too late. China has social media now. It‚Äôs too strong.‚ÄĚ
‚ÄúHabibi, can I smoke here?‚ÄĚ None of us knew the answer to the old woman‚Äôs question. Unlike most of Western Europe, certain countries in the Middle East seem to positively encourage smoking indoors. We didn‚Äôt know the view of Baghdad airport. One of us turned to an airport official, sitting idly outside one of the many single-room offices in the building to check. ‚ÄúIt‚Äôs illegal, but you can do it if you‚Äôre discreet.‚ÄĚ The woman‚Äôs family suggested she go and smoke in the toilet. She declined, but the conversation then turned to morality - not of whether it was right to break the rules, but whether smoking was morally acceptable. The general conclusion seemed to be that it was - and in that case the formal airport rules were largely irrelevant. Its this sort of logic that is informing much of Iraqi politics at the moment. In the absence of norms and precedents, the early years of any new democratic politics are always characterised by a fight over how the rules should be interpreted. Argument tends to revolve around what‚Äôs right, rather than by what the constitution says. With all sides claiming that their version of the truth is the definitive one. With no common agreement about what the Iraqi constitution means, Prime Minister, parliament and ministries have been engaged in a relentless series of tussles about the respective powers of their institutions in recent months. In parliament, Speaker Nujaifi is pushing parliament‚Äôs prerogatives to call ministers in to be questioned. Individual ministries are resisting. One committee‚Äôs attempt to conduct a ministerial hearing resulted in the minister storming out, telling the committee that he had come to tell them how to do their job, not to be asked questions. In May the Supreme Court weighed in, with a ruling that in order to question any minister, parliament needed evidence that the minister had breached the constitution. Turning the logic of parliamentary scrutiny on its head, the decision means that parliament is unable to ask ministers for information about their work - only to accuse them of constitutional violations once they have evidence. This battle widened during the spring into an attempt to remove Prime Minister Maliki, with opposition parties trying to find enough MPs to force a vote of no confidence. In retaliation, MPs loyal to the PM have sought to find ways of removing Speaker Nujaifi, and the Prime Minister has talked about forcing early elections. None of this seems likely to happen in the near future, but the political scuffles seems set to continue, with both sides trying to make life as difficult as possible for the other. Perhaps the most farcical skirmish in this battle came at the end of June when, apparently at Maliki‚Äôs behest, the blast walls protecting parliament were removed, thus exposing the building to direct attack from the Red Zone. With impeccable timing this was one day before parliament was due to return after a month‚Äôs recess ‚Äď and attempt to unseat the PM. In the event, parliament had another three days off, much to the delight of many staff, before the walls were put back up - with the security measures around the parliament tighter than they were beforehand. Although the tone of politics may seem petty and counterproductive, there are significant political issues at stake. The way the constitution and parliamentary procedures are interpreted now, will shape how Iraqi politics works for some time to come. Once precedents are laid, they are very difficult to pull up. All sides realise the importance of determining how government works in practice. It is a battle over how power is exercised, and by whom. The process may be messy, but it is inevitable. All mature democracies went through similar phases, often over decades. One story from the US Congress in the nineteenth century describes how the Speaker was punched by one member, guns were drawn and the plenary session degenerated into a free-for-all brawl. By comparison with Western Europe and North America, Iraq‚Äôs attempts to establish democratic processes are remarkably swift. Patterns will establish themselves, but until they do, argument is likely to be characterised by emotion and different views of what‚Äôs right, rather than rules. Back at the airport, a different official provides us with another metaphor for Iraq‚Äôs politics. Asked why one passenger was being ushered to the front of the static and seemingly endless check-in queues, he responded with a blank look and drily stated, ‚ÄúAku Asbaab.‚ÄĚ That is, simply, ‚Äúthere are reasons‚ÄĚ. Its difficult to argue with that sort of logic.
A diverse group of civil society groups from across sub-Saharan Africa today launched a statement affirming the internet‚Äôs central role as a space to enable democratisation and promote human rights. The statement calls on a wide range of stakeholders to strengthen their support for human rights online, to extend initiatives to improve access to information, and to facilitate effective civil society participation in all governance processes addressing internet-related issues. The civil society groups from the human rights, media and ICT sectors met at the end of July in Nairobi, Kenya at a two day event organised by Global Partners & Associates, the Association for Progressive Communications, the Kenya Human Rights Commission and Ford Foundation East Africa. The explosion of digital communication technologies is arguably the most significant phenomenon of the last century, amplifying human potential across all dimensions.¬† As such, the politically and economically powerful are increasingly seeking to consolidate and further their power over and within this new medium. The internet‚Äôs potential for democracy could be lost if inappropriate forms of regulation and control are introduced, restricting openness and creativity. In this complex environment who is there to defend the public interest? Until recently this task has fallen with the engineers responsible for developing the internet, and a small number of ‚Äúearly adopters‚ÄĚ within civil society. However, a number of high profile threats to internet freedom have emerged over the last couple of years. These include cuts to internet access during the Arab Spring, threats of very restrictive copyright and surveillance legislation in the United States, and demands for a new internet governance regime that give governments greater control. These threats to internet freedom have gradually brought a wider range of human rights groups to the table. This event and the statement are testimony to this, and hopefully signify the start of a larger, stronger and more coordinated civil society voice for the internet. Read the statement here
This May, the Brazilian government took an important step towards openness and transparency as its Access to Information (ATI) Law came into effect.* Two months into the implementation process, Brazilian public bodies had received over 17,000 information requests and the Office of the Comptroller-General (CGU) ‚Äď the regulator responsible for its implementation ‚Äď reported that over 83% of requests had been processed and answered. These numbers are extremely positive (comparatively, Argentinian executive received only 2,543 requests in three years), and highlight the Law‚Äôs potential to create new space for dialogue between the Brazilian government and its citizenry. However, the law faces many challenges.¬† We know very little about the quality of the answers, and public agencies have been accused of using legal loopholes to avoid providing information. Perhaps the biggest challenge, though, is tackling the deeply-engrained culture of secrecy and state control within Brazil‚Äôs government.¬† For such laws to work, public servants need to be committed to its ideals, journalists need to understand how to use its provisions and, with civil society, need to be raising public awareness about their rights. To help with this process, Global Partners has been commissioned by UNESCO in Brazil to develop and test an M&E framework with a set of tools to assist the Brazilian government and the CGU in tracking the progress of implementation of the Law. Over the next 2 years, we will be following and evaluating the government‚Äôs efforts to implement the Law and its impact on the Brazilian society. * Access to information laws, sometimes referred to as ‚Äúsunshine laws‚ÄĚ, regulate right of, and procedures for, the public to request and receive government-held information. At the moment, over 90 countries have in place some form of ATI legislation.
The two run off candidates in Egypt‚Äôs presidential elections could not have been more divisive. The comments of Tawfiq Ukasha, one time presidential hopeful, reflected the views of many: "If Morsi wins, I have visas for three countries ready." But he reflected the views of the felool -¬†a derogatory term used to describe the remnants of the Mubarak regime. The prospect of a win by his fellow felool, Ahmed Shafiq, provoked equally strong responses, with threats of a return to Tahrir Square and more running battles between protestors and military. The fact is that most Egyptians support neither felool nor the Ikhwan. In the first round, more than half of Egypt‚Äôs voters supported four other, and less polarising, candidates such as Hamdeen Sabahi, Abdel Aboul Fotouh and Amr Moussa. As such, many Egyptians felt that the political system denied them a real choice. The new president faces huge economic and social problems, but resolving them will mean an approach to politics which is new to Egypt. The country faces a messy period ‚Äď literally and figuratively. Anyone new to Cairo will be struck by the rubbish in the streets, the decrepit buildings and the fumes from the constantly clogged traffic. Since the revolution foreign investment has dried up, tourism has been badly hit, the Egyptian currency has faltered and unemployment continues to rise. The public want to see the economy improve and feel safe on the streets. These fears are shaping attitudes to politics. Morsi will have to work hard to gain the trust of most voters and build cross-party support for his presidency. Egyptians need to be reassured that they have not swapped Mubarak‚Äôs one party rule for an Islamist version of the same thing. So far the parliamentary performance of the Freedom and Justice Party‚Äôs (FJP ‚Äď the political arm of the Muslim Brothers) has not got them many new friends. Fears of Islamism remain and their attempt to dominate the constitutional convention seemed to imply they would simply use force of numbers rather strength of argument to win political debates. In a multi party democracy opposition and government parties should work together for the benefit of the population rather than separately to score political gains from one another. Disagreement and debate are essential. But, critically, parties need to be able to oppose the dominant view, without being demonised as enemies of the state ‚Äď as was the case under Mubarak. In short, it is possible to be loyal to nation, but opposed to the government at the same time. The new president will also need to negotiate with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF). The military has been in charge since Mubarak‚Äôs demise, and they appear more interested in simply retaining their autonomy and areas of control ‚Äď particularly over their vast financial interests - than in ruling the entire country. Few can discern a clear SCAF strategy, instead they seem to use uncertainty and ambiguity to gain powers when and where they can. The constitutional court‚Äôs decision to dissolve the lower house of parliament in June was interpreted by some as a warning for the FJP to tread carefully. The space for democracy to flourish depends on the military leaving the political sphere entirely, and that space will need to be carefully negotiated. Underpinning all this though is the need to restore public faith in politics itself.¬† In all new democracies, the new system is invested with unrealistic hopes about what can be achieved.¬† During that period disillusion sets in, as results take time to deliver, and citizens start to look elsewhere for the solutions to their problems, often questioning the legitimacy of the system itself.¬† The hard lesson is that under democracy you do not always get what you want.¬† But that is not a reason for abandoning it.¬† That is its strength. The biggest achievement of a Morsi presidency would be to consolidate Egypt‚Äôs political system between now and the next elections.¬† Its legitimacy will be tested by challenges in the shape of the constitutional convention, the role of SCAF, the dissolution of parliament and the involvement of the courts in politics.¬† But as Samuel Huntington pointed out 20 years ago, What determines whether or not new democracies survive ‚Ä¶ is the way in which political leaders respond to their inability to solve the problems facing the country ‚Ä¶ Democracies become consolidated when people learn that democracy is a solution to the problem of tyranny, but not necessarily anything else
It‚Äôs easy to miss the bullet holes in the walls of Haider Muthana‚Äôs office.¬† They form eight neat craters in the ceramic tiles that cover one half of the room. ¬†¬†Muthana is the head of the parliamentary directorate responsible for the internal organisation of Iraq‚Äôs Council of Representatives, supporting the legislative process and the work of the committees.¬† The fact that his office was once the garage for Saddam Hussein‚Äôs cars, when he made speeches at the conference centre that now houses the parliament, tells you much about the circumstances in which the parliamentary staff and politicians operate. The conference centre is a large brown, ugly building, characterised by cracked windows, fraying carpets and exposed electrical wires hanging from ceilings and walls around almost every corner.¬† The centre was never designed to be a parliament, and the staff and committees have found makeshift homes where they could find them, often only reached by lengthy walks up stairs or down meandering corridors.¬† The effect on the building of the mortar fire, IEDs and gun battles that were routine until very recently, have not made things any easier.¬†¬† So, by comparison with the dilapidation in the rest of Iraq‚Äôs parliamentary building, the bullet holes and pockmarks are easily overlooked.¬† Yet, the changing state of Muthana‚Äôs office - and of that of the CoR more widely reflects the slow and incremental political progress in Iraq. A recent report from the International Crisis Group was damning in its criticism of the parliament‚Äôs record in exercising effective oversight over Iraq‚Äôs government.¬† It‚Äôs difficult to argue with many of their conclusions.¬† But it‚Äôs also easy to underestimate the scale of the task that has faced both politicians and parliamentary staff.¬†¬† A few years ago Iraq exhibited the most extreme form of zero-sum politics.¬† There was no trust between the political blocs - and very little trust even between members of the same parties.¬† Those divisions still exist.¬† The tensions between Prime Minister Maliki‚Äôs State of Law party and Ayad Allawi‚Äôs Iraqiyya, are the most obvious and constant challenge to the functioning of government and parliament. ¬†It took a year to form the government and get the committees appointed.¬† There remains a huge backlog of legislation and intra-party negotiation on all matters is tortuous. But there are small signs of improvement. ¬†The current Speaker of the CoR is a formidable figure who has brought some order to proceedings.¬† Where previously MP's ambled into the plenary session until it was quorate, one of the first acts of Speaker Nujaifi was to oblige MPs to register their attendance ‚Äď fining MPs for non-attendance and publishing their names. The Speaker recently won a significant battle with the government in ensuring that the Supreme Audit Institution and Transparency Commission reported to it rather than to the Prime Minister, and will appoint its members.¬† And, the committees ‚Äď which are the engine of the parliament - are starting to find their feet and to work on a cross-party basis.¬† The Human Rights Committee, for example, is closely watching the creation of the independent Human Rights Commission, and the Finance Committee will shortly start to grapple with the state budget.¬† At the same time the conference centre itself is slowly being overhauled.¬† Although the first stone of the new parliamentary building was laid in late September, it will take several years to complete.¬† In the meantime, there is a continuous buzz as offices are refurbished, new carpets laid and windows replaced.¬† Muthana‚Äôs office itself has become a more professional and comfortable place with new furniture, partitioned walls, and additional staff in the last year. If you look for them, the signs of change are starting to happen.¬† There is no doubt that the challenges for Iraqi politics are massive.¬†¬† The gains remain fragile and the differences may be limited and easy to miss ‚Äď like bullet holes covered in polyfilla ‚Äď and their significance should not be overstated.¬† But for all that, neither should they be dismissed.¬† Political change most often starts with the small things, which we hope may be indications of a much deeper shift.